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COMMENT
THE AUTHORITY OF A CALIFORNIA JUDGE TO
COMMENT ON A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
GUILT: COMMON LAW IN A STATE OF FLUX
INTRODUCTION
In an era of increased concern for the rights of the criminal
defendant, legal safeguards have been bolstered at every stage of
the criminal process, commencing with the defendant's initial con-
frontation with police authority and continuing through the trial
stage and the correctional process. As thorough as this legal re-
form has been, a particularly crucial aspect of criminal procedure
has eluded wide-spread attention. This problem typically arises
with the charge delivered by the trial judge to the jury, when the
judge chooses to make some personal observations concerning the
case which has been presented. When these observations take
the form of opinions on the defendant's guilt, the goal of a fair
adjudication of issues of criminal liability may well be frustrated.
The California constitution' and the California Penal Code2
contain open-ended provisions granting to the court the power to
comment on the evidence and testimony that have been presented
at trial. The parameters of permissible comment by a trial judge
concerning the ultimate issue of a defendant's guilt will be ex-
plored in the material to follow. California law on this subject
will be summarized and criticized. The dangers of unrestricted
comment on guilt from the bench to the jury will be considered,
and the necessity for restraints on such comment will be empha-
sized. The English common law provides the necessary concep-
1. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (West 1972) reads in part: "The court may
make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any wit-
ness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause."
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1127 (West 1954) reads in part:
In charging the jury the court may instruct the jury regarding the law
applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such comment on the
evidence and the testimony and the credibility of any witness as in its
opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the case and in any
criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to ex-
plain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
against him may be commented upon by the court. The court shall in-
form the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the wit-
nesses.
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tual tools for understanding the disorderly formulation of rules and
guidelines which attempt to delineate appropriate judicial com-
ment concerning a defendant's guilt.
COMMENTS ON GUILT: THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW POSITION
The English court system, during its developmental period
in the eleventh through the fifteenth centuries, lacked definitive
rules of evidence and procedure.3  The trial judge freely modified
and created rules of evidence as he deemed proper to facilitate
the fact-finding process. What was even then recognized as hear-
say was commonly admitted.4 The judge could call witnesses
to support the positions of one party to the detriment of the other.5
He could question the defendant from the bench, and could fine
and imprison members of the jury for returning a verdict with
which the judge disagreed. 6 Surprisingly, this latitude of judicial
power did not extend to the pre-verdict independence of the jury,
which was formalistically protected. A judge faced with a jury
verdict of which he strongly disapproved was able in post-verdict
proceedings to imprison individual jurors, but this potent weapon
had no place prior to a verdict, where judicial deference to the
judgment of the jury in matters of fact promoted the development
of an independent jury. Medieval English judicial behavior dis-
played a consistent tendency of the judge to play the role of the
umpire of a game.7  Extensive responsibility was vested in the
jury to make difficult findings of fact with a minimum of judicial
assistance. In criminal cases, the judge was careful not to play
the role of the inquisitor. 8
By the sixteenth century it was the accepted practice of the
trial judge, when charging the jury, to sum up or "repeat" to the
jury the evidence which had been presented at trial.9 Although
such summation did not necessarily pose any challenge to the fact-
finding independence of the jury, when this "repeating" function
was set in the context of the judge's extensive powers to determine
relevancy and admissibility of evidence, it provided a forum for
expression of the judge's opinion about the strength of the case
presented against the defendant. The charge of the judge in the
3. 2 F. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 655(2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
4. Id. at 636. See also I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
IN ENGLAND 439-40 (1883) [hereinafter cited as STEPHEN].
5. POLLOCK & MAITLAND 671.
6. Id. at 670-71.
7. Id. at 671.
8. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 326.
9. Compare this practice with a modem counterpart in text accompanying
note 60 infra.
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then-celebrated case of Oates provides an extreme example of an
expression of judicial opinion in the guise of a summation of evi-
dence:
And sure I am if you think these witnesses swear true, as I
cannot see any colour of objection, there does not remain the
least doubt but ,that Oates is the blackest and most perjured
villian that ever appeared upon the face of the earth. 10
More typically, judicial comment on the facts served a valu-
able advisory function, since the summing-up process placed be-
fore the jury in understandable language the fact-finding tasks it
was about to undertake. Acting within common law powers, the
English trial judge became the mentor of the jury, a learned coun-
selor who freely directed its attention to pertinent factual aspects
of the case. Gradually the power of the judge to repeat the facts
to the jury was transformed by opinionated judges into a power
to comment on the facts of the case."
The United States Supreme Court readily acknowledged the
integration of this English view into American jurisprudence. Mr.
Justice Gray, writing in Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad Co. v. Put-
nam,12 gave a concise summary of what may be called the English
position:
In the courts of the United States, as in ,those of England,
from which our practice was derived, ,the judge, in submitting
a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks
,it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion,
comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of
it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon
the facts . .- .. 13
These broad powers of comment granted to the judge by the
English rule were commonly interpreted by American courts to
permit the trial judge to express the opinion that the defendant
was guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.' 4 Such expres-
sion could take the form of a comment that the prosecution had
sustained its burden of proof,' 5 that the defendant's defenses were
meritless, 16 or that the conduct of the defendant conformed to all
10. 10 St. Tr. 1079, 1226 (1685).
11. M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 291 (1672).
12. 118 U.S. 545 (1886).
13. Id. at 553.
14. See People v. Rupp, 41 Cal. 2d 371, 260 P.2d 1 (1953); People v. Daugh-
erty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911 (1953); People v. Patubo, 9 Cal. 2d 537, 71
P.2d 270 (1937); People v. Moore, Crim. No. 24776 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist.,
July 25, 1974); People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203
(1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968). See also People v. Warren, 16 Cal.
2d 103, 104 P.2d 1024 (1940); People v. Ottey, 5 Cal. 2d 714, 56 P.2d 193
(1936).
15. People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 426 P.2d 889, 58 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1967).
16. See People v. Slater, 60 Cal. App. 2d 358, 140 P.2d 846 (1943). But
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the elements of a crime." Similarly, the charge to the jury could
take on a general tenor, due to its content and manner of delivery,
that conveyed the judge's opinion of the defendant's guilt.18
HISTORICAL CYCLES AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Legal historians have observed a tendency for the role of
the judge to fluctuate between that of the passive judge, the pre-
siding officer exemplifying neutrality, and that of the active judge,
aggressively commenting on evidence and freely advising the
jury.19 The English position favors an active role for the trial
judge. 20  This approach had less than national acceptance
throughout the United States.
Beginning in North Carolina in 1795 and spreading across
the South and West, a body of legal opinion adopted a position
contrary to the English rule,2' imposing restrictions on permissible
judicial comment to the jury. Roscoe Pound and other observers
of legal history have attributed this shift to a desire to prevent a
recurrence of the political oppression experienced by colonial
Americans in the hands of judges owing allegiance to the King."
It was believed that a strong and independent jury system could
guarantee against repressive courts. The rise of Jacksonian dem-
ocracy in the early nineteenth century, with its philosophical dis-
taste for an elite leadership not answerable to the public, acceler-
ated this trend toward limiting judicial power.23 In the nineteenth
century attempts were made in a majority of states to prevent trial
judges from commenting on evidence.24 The California constitu-
tion of 1849 included a provision precluding a judge from com-
menting on matters of fact, but allowing a statement of the testi-
mony and declaration of the law from the bench.25 With a split
see People v. Flores, 17 Cal. App. 3d 579, 95 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1971); People v.
Graham, 156 Cal. App. 2d 525, 319 P.2d 677 (1958).
17. People v. Shannon, 260 Cal. App. 2d 320, 67 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1968).
18. See People v. Marrone, 210 Cal. App. 2d 299, 26 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1962);
People v. Robinson, 73 Cal. App. 2d 233, 166 P.2d 17 (1946). But see People
v. Hooper, 92 Cal. App. 2d 524, 207 P.2d 117 (1949).
19. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 670.
20. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *375 (1791 ed.). See note 33 and
accompanying text infra for a discussion of the integration of this position into
California law.
21. A. HOLTZOFF (chairman), INSTRUCTIONS TO JURORS, REPORT OF A COM-
MITTEE OF THE SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, 10 F.R.D. 409 (1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 REPORT].
22. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 122-23 (1921).
23. Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
24. Id.
25. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1849) provided: "Judges shall not charge ju-
ries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the
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of authority developing between proponents of the common law
unrestricted power to comment and statutes or judicial decisions
prohibiting judicial comment on facts and credibility, the stage was
set for a Supreme Court review of the possible constitutional di-
mensions of a trial judge's comment on a criminal defendant's
guilt.
UNITED STATES V. MURDOCK
26
Defendant Murdock was convicted for wilful failure to ans-
wer questions posed by Internal Revenue agents concerning the
computation of his tax liability. During the charge to the jury,
the judge exercised broad powers of comment, stating that the
government had sustained its burden of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while cautioning the jury
that it might choose to disregard the court's view. Defendant
Murdock requested but was refused an instruction that if the de-
fendant's refusal to answer questions posed by Internal Revenue
agents was based upon his good faith belief that he need not ans-
wer, it would not constitute a wilful refusal. Such wilfuless was
an element of the crime charged. 7 The defendant had argued
during his trial that his fifth amendment right against self-incrim-
ination formed the basis of his good faith belief that he need not
answer.
28
Given this set of facts, the Court set up sketchy guidelines
for determining those cases in which a federal trial judge could
inform the jury that he believed the defendant to be guilty.
Although the power of ,the judge to express an opinion as to
,the guilt of the defendant exists, it should be exercised cau-
tiously and only in exceptional cases. 29
The Court did not choose to limit the meaning of "exceptional
cases" by means of an exclusive definition, but it did explain that
in the case before it the comments of the trial judge were inappro-
priate because they had the effect of foreclosing from the consid-
eration of the jury a fundamental defense of the defendant,
namely that his refusal to answer was not wilful. It follows from
law." This provision later appeared unaltered in CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 19
(1879).
26. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
27. Defendant was charged with violation of the Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch.
27, § 1114, 44 Stat. 116. It provided for prosecution for purposeful evasion of
federal income taxes.
28. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Murdock was de-
cided by the Court on two separate occasions; the first decision dealt with a fifth
amendment self-incrimination issue, holding that the defendant could not invoke
fifth amendment protections. The second occasion is the one emphasized in this
section of this Comment.
29. 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
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this reasoning that included in the class of "exceptional cases" are
those in which no questions of fact are left for the jury to decide
before finding the defendant guilty of the charged offense.80
The Court artfully avoided basing its decision on constitu-
tional guarantees."' Subsequently, the decision has been inter-
preted as being based on the Court's power to supervise proce-
dural matters in federal courts.3 2 Thus Murdock, lacking consti-
tutional dimensions, does not govern the scope of judicial com-
ment in state cases. Any application to the states must be by the
force of its reasoning rather than by force of law, and the failure
of the Court to define "exceptional cases" further dilutes its force.
CALIFORNIA ADOPTS THE COMMON LAW POSITION
On November 6, 1934, article VI, section 19, an amendment
to the California constitution, became effective." This amend-
ment extended to the trial judge the authority to comment on the
evidence, on the testimony, and on the credibility of any witness,
including the defendant. This constitutional provision incorpo-
rated what may be described as a curative requirement, mandating
disclosure to the jurors that they remain the exclusive determiners
of questions of fact and of the credibility of witnesses. Section
19 has been read by many California courts as authority for the
proposition that so long as a judge informs the jury of its inde-
pendence and freedom to disregard opinions about fact and credi-
bility issued from the bench, the authority of the jury and the right
of the defendant to a jury trial have been protected.8 4
30. See TRIAL JUDGE'S REMARKS AS TO GUILT, 7 A.L.R. FED. 377, 381 (1971)
for a discussion of federal courts' interpretation of the meaning of "exceptional
cases." Compare Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920), with
McBride v. United States, 314 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1963); Sadler v. United States,
303 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1962); Davis v. United States, 227 F.2d 568 (10th Cir.
1955).
31. 290 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1933).
32. Gonsoir v. Craven, 449 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. CAL. CONST. art. VI, 19 (repealed 1966) provided:
The court may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the
facts of the case, and may make such comment on the evidence and the
testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary
for the proper determination of the case. The court shall inform thejury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions
of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of witnesses.
For a discussion of the history of this amendment see People v. Friend, 50
Cal. 2d 570, 576, 327 P.2d 97, 100 (1958) in which the court described the in-
tention of the amendment as best reflected by the ballot argument in its favor,
which read in part:
This measure enables the trial judge to comment to the jury on the
facts of the case; to give the jurors his analysis of the evidence and to
express his opinion on the merits of the case. . . . (emphasis added).
For a compelling defense of broad judicial powers of comment see 1951 REPORT,
supra note 21.
34. See note 45 infra.
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In 1958, in the leading case of People v. Friend," the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court read section 19 in the context of the com-
mon law powers California judges had been exercising since the
enactment of the amendment. The court observed that a judge
may express opinions as to the guilt or innocence8" of a criminal
defendant so long as the province of the jury as the exclusive trier
of issues of fact and credibility, as defined by section 19, is not
invaded. 7 The Friend court, in deference to established judicial
practice, held that comments on the defendant's guilt could be
made pursuant to section 19. It reasoned that the purpose of the
constitutional amendment was to allow the judge to assist jurors
in the analysis of difficult and possibly conflicting aspects of evi-
dence, and that comments pertaining to punishment and guilt
were often necessary to make such assistance meaningful.38
The Friend decision placed faith in the proposition embodied
in section 19 that a jury informed of its exclusive powers to decide
issues of fact and credibility will exercise those powers. The pro-
tection of the independence of the jury, however, often amounted
in practice to nothing more than a colorless recitation by the judge
of the powers of the jury, followed by extensive judicial comment
approaching the realm of open advocacy.39 The Friend court
sought to strike an acceptable balance between the mandate of
the voters that judges should assist jurors in determination of a
given case, and the statutory duty of the jury to remain the exclu-
sive determiner of issues of fact and witness credibility. To ad-
vance this end the judge was allowed to express the opinion that
the defendant was guilty. This holding indicates a fundamental
lack of sensitivity by the Friend court towards such recurring fac-
tors as unduly impressionable jurors and particularly convincing
trial judges.40
35. 50 Cal. 2d 570, 327 P.2d 97 (1958).
36. While the subject of commentary on the innocence of the defendant is
beyond the scope of this Comment, the theoretical similarities with comments on
guilt render many arguments interchangeable.
37. The court explained that the phrase "so long as the province of the jury
is not invaded" is understood to mean that the judge:
[M]ay not withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration
or distort the testimony, and his comments should be temperately and
fairly made, rather than . . . amounting to partisan advocacy. The jury
* * * must remain as the exclusive arbiter of questions of fact ...
50 Cal. 2d 570, 577-78, 327 P.2d 97, 101 (1958).
38. Id. at 576-77, 327 P.2d at 100-01.
39. See People v. Graham, 156 Cal. App. 2d 525, 319 P.2d 525 (1958); Peo-
ple v. Hooper, 92 Cal. App. 2d 524, 207 P.2d 117 (1949); People v. Robinson,
73 Cal. App. 2d 233, 166 P.2d 17 (1946). See generally Note, Trial Judge's
Right to Comment on Evidence Pertaining to Punishment in Capital Offense
Cases, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1959).
40. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933); Braley v. Gladden,
403 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1968); People v. Smith, 267 Cal. App. 2d 155, 162, 72
19741
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Another disturbing element of the Friend decision is its inter-
pretation of section 19 as permitting the trial judge to sum up only
evidence unfavorable to the defendant's case while ignoring favor-
able evidence. Such a presentation of the facts can have a far
more persuasive and prejudicial effect upon jurors than would a
straightforward statement of opinion, since its status as an expres-
sion of opinion is not made explicit."
THE FANTASY OF THE CURATIVE INCANTATION
Case law is replete with commentary attesting to the usually
influential position that the trial judge occupies in the eyes of the
jury.42 When a trial judge exercises his common law or statutory
authority to comment on the facts of the case, the possibility be-
comes particularly acute that the jury will abdicate its decision-
making role, and, without making preliminary findings of fact,
agree with the judge's opinion concerning guilt. When a judge's
comments have this effect, the province of the jury has been in-
vaded and the defendant's right to trial by jury has been severely
compromised.4 3  In order to reconcile the common law power of
the trial judge to comment on the facts and evidence with this
likely prejudicial consequence, two basic types of curative re-
minders to the jury have been developed. The first type consists
of an instruction to the jurors that they are the exclusive judges
of questions of fact, and are free to disregard any opinions ex-
pressed by the trial judge on questions of fact. A typical caution-
ary instruction of this type was given by the trial judge in United
States v. Murdock."' The law recognizes such instructions as cap-
Cal. Rptr. 696, 703 (1968). Justice Jochems, dissenting in State v. Wheat, 131
Kan. 562, 566, 292 P. 793, 797 (1930) explained:
The trial judge occupies a high position. He presides over the trial.
The jury has great respect for him. They can be easily influenced by
the slightest suggestion coming from the court, whether it be a nod of
the head, a smile, a frown, or a spoken word. It is therefore imperative
that the trial judge shall conduct himself with the utmost caution in or-
der that the unusual power he possesses shall not be abused.
See also ABA CANONS OF JuDicAL ETHICS, No. 5.
41. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. Sixth amendment arguments, asserting a denial of the right to jury trial
resulting from comment on guilt, have had little success; see Gonsoir v. Craven,
449 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1971) where the court refused to reach this issue. See
also Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1971) where the court ex-
presses a reluctance to "constitutionalize" any rule governing the scope of permis-
sible judicial comment. This presumably includes a reluctance to recognize any
sixth amendment claim.
44. 290 U.S. 389, 393. The instruction in Murdock reads in part:
So far as the facts are concerned in this case, gentlemen of the jury,
I want to instruct you that whatever the court may say as to the facts,
it is only the court's view. You are at liberty to entirely disregard it.
The court feels from the evidence in this case . . . that this defendant
is guilty in a manner and form as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
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able of curing the most flagrant remarks by the judge, including
imputations of guilt to the defendant.4 5 In California, California
Jury Instructions Criminal serve as the most common means by
which juries are informed that they are the exclusive judges of
fact, empowered to disregard comments from the bench on evi-
dence, testimony, credibility, and guilt.46
A second type of curative requirement is not embodied in
a specific warning to the jury, but takes the form of a condition
imposed on the trial judge. Should the judge decide to present
his opinion on the guilt of the accused, he must combine this with
a discussion of relevant evidence that led him to the formulation
of this opinion. Such a requirement is rooted in English common
law,47 and can be implied directly from California written law.
Those statutes which have been interpreted to allow judicial com-
ment on guilt are worded so as to allow judicial comment on evi-
dence.48  The California Supreme Court indicated that the power
to comment on guilt was conceptually dependent on the power
to comment on evidence.4" California cases have recognized the
necessity for disclosure of factual support for judicial comment
concerning guilt as a means of demonstrating the evidentiary basis
for a judge's opinion." The requirement of such a disclosure
45. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the efficacy of the section
19 curative requirement for the first time in People v. Ottey, 5 Cal. 2d 714, 56
P.2d 193 (1936).
46. CALIC Instruction No. 17.32 provides:
I have not intended by anything I have said or done, or by any
questions that I may have asked, to intimate or suggest how you should
decide any questions of fact submitted to you.
If anything I have done or said has seemed to so indicate, you will
disregard it and form your own opinion.
At this time, however, and for the purpose of assisting you in de-
ciding this case, I am permitted by the Constitution of California to
comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any wit-
ness.
My comments are intended to be advisory only and are not binding
on you as you are the exclusive judges of the questions of fact submitted
to you and of the credibility of the witnesses.,
You should disregard any or all of the comments if they do not
agree with your views of the evidence and the credibility of the wit-
nesses.
47. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *375 (1791 ed.) relates:
When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the judge, in the
presence of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up the whole
to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the
main question and principal issue lies, stating what evidence has been
given to support it, with such remarks as he thinks necessary for their
direction, and giving them his opinion in matters of law arising upon
the evidence. (emphasis added).
See text accompanying note 11 supra.
48. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
49. People v. Ottey, 5 Cal. 2d 714, 56 P.2d 193 (1936).
50. See People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 651-52, 426 P.2d 889, 893, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 325 (1967); People v. Smith, 267 Cal. App. 2d 155, 163, 72 Cal. Rptr.
696, 702 (1968).
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theoretically tends to preclude the issuance of unfounded and un-
justifiable opinions from the bench, limiting the expression of
opinions to those supported by evidence in the record. Un-
fortunately this requirement places only a weak constraint on the
trial judge. If a judge wishes to issue an opinion to the jury that
the defendant has been shown to be guilty, it is only the rarest
of trial records that is not replete with morsels of evidence to sup-
port such an opinion. In such a context, the requirement for a
disclosure of a factual basis for opinions from the bench serves
more as a technique for reinforcing and adding persuasive power
to a judge's opinions than it serves as a bar against arbitrary and
capricious expressions of belief.
The requirement that an evidentiary basis accompany an ex-
pression of opinion by the trial judge similarly fails to provide
meaningful safeguards at the appellate level. Given the adversary
system, competent counsel are likely to have supplied briefs which
delineate evidence supporting a trial judge's opinions. The appel-
late judge can selectively point to the evidence emphasized in the
briefs and conclude that an evidentiary basis for opinions did exist,
yet at the same time fail to address the issue of the prejudicial
impact of a trial judge's opinions on a particular set of jurors.
Both of the curative devices which have been discussed are
designed to preserve the independence of the jury. In many in-
stances they tend to have precisely the opposite effect. The mere
existence of a curative incantation fosters the conviction that un-
justified or excessive judicial comment can be purged of its prej-
udicial potential, or "cured", by a simple direction to the jury to
look at the facts and decide for itself. Such a formalistic concep-
tion of the charge to the jury ignores the compelling force of the
trial judge's opinions on the jury.
The concept that an instruction can "cure" any prejudicial ef-
fect of judicial comment on guilt presupposes initially that the
''curative incantation" will convince jurors to adhere to instructions
and temper any tendency towards uncritical faith in judicial opin-
ion. Given a curative instruction potent enough to be adopted
by the jury as a mandate for jury independence, it has the poten-
tial for exerting two contradictory influences on the jury.5' The
incantation may in fact be adhered to by some jurors as an effec-
tive direction to make an independent determination of culpabil-
ity. Alternatively, such an instruction may be construed by jurors
as evidence of the sincerity and compelling force of the judge's
51. Cf. People v. Smith, 267 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159, 72 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699
n.1 (1968) where the court quotes the trial judge: "[Nior, in the alternative, can
you say, 'He's trying to get us to decide the case this way; we will teach him
a lesson and decide it the other way.'"
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opinion, since in spite of the legal recognition of the potential prej-
udicial effect of such an opinion, the judge has decided never-
theless to exercise his power of comment. This is a prime ex-
ample of how potency is infused into an opinion by phrasing it
in legal terminology and presenting it in a legal context.
Similarly, the requirement that a judge support his expression
of opinion with a display of supporting evidence does not neces-
sarily subordinate this opinion to a set of objective facts in evi-
dence which can be employed by the jury to reach independent
conclusions. Sir James F. Stephen, Justice, King's Bench, de-
scribed the process of summing up the facts by the judge as neces-
sarily intertwined with the expression of an opinion:
I further think that he ought not conceal his opinion
from the jury, nor do I see how it is possible for him to do
so if he arranges the evidence in the order in which it strikes
his mind. The mere effort to see what is essential to a story,
in what order the important events happened, and in what
relation they stand to each other must of necessity point to
a conclusion.52
The ritual of respect attached to the trial judge further com-
plicates the task of convincing the juror that an opinion issuing
from the bench is to be considered advisory rather than conclu-
sionary. The judge dons a black robe. He decides questions of
law. People stand in respect as he ascends the bench. He is a
specialist in the administration of justice. Is it any wonder that,
with such symbols of authority attached to his office, his opinions
are regarded with extraordinary import by the jury?
CALIFORNIA LAW TODAY: A DRIFT AWAY FROM
UNRESTRICTED COMMENTARY POWER
In the case of People v. Brock5" the California Supreme
Court took the opportunity to review the scope of judicial com-
ment on guilt sanctioned by the California constitution. The trial
judge in Brock had instructed the jury in a manner consistent with
the English common law.54 The judge cautioned the jury in ex-
plicit terms that his comments were not to be interpreted as an
52. STEPHEN, supra note 4 at 455.
53. 66 Cal. 2d 645, 426 P.2d 889, 58 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1967).
54. Id. at 649, 426 P.2d at 891, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The instruction read
in part:
It is the opinion of this Court, based on the evidence, that the guilt of
the defendant Sam Brock as to both offenses charged, has been estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt. I would caution you, however, that
it is your right and duty to exercise the same independence of judgment
in weighing my comment on the evidence as you are entitled to exercise
in weighing the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel.
(Italics of Cal. Sup. Ct. omitted).
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attempt to compel a verdict, and that the jurors remained the ex-
clusive judges of questions of fact.55 The Brock court held that,
in spite of the trial judge's admonitions to the jury mandating inde-
pendence of thought, the comments, taken as a whole, amounted
to a directed verdict.56 The trial judge conveyed the impression
that his comments were to be given equal weight with the testi-
mony in the case. 57
The court attempted to reconcile its disapproval of the Brock
comment with other California cases approving similar remarks by
trial judges by emphasizing the fact that in this case the judge
made a "general comment on guilt without discussion of the evi-
dence.""6  Such a comment did nothing to aid the jury in apply-
ing the law to the evidence in the case, and had the prejudicial
effect of encouraging the jury to avoid preliminary fact-findings.
Hence, the comment frustrated the purpose of the constitutional
provision, which was to aid jury determination of the ultimate issue
of guilt.5"
One of the effects of the Brock decision was to read into Ar-
ticle VI of the California constitution60 a requirement that any
comment on the guilt of the defendant be supported by an explan-
ation of the evidentiary basis for this inference of guilt. At first
blush this appears to be little more than a reaffirmation of the
position taken in People v. Friend,6 but the Brock court added
an important precondition to such comment, that where there
exists a "conflict in the evidence" no judicial comment on guilt
should be made. 2 The court declined, however, to state categori-
cally that a clear judicial expression of opinion that the defendant
was guilty, when evidence probative of guilt was in conflict, would
be per se improper, warranting reversal. 63  While evidencing a
distaste for any tendency of a trial judge to pick and choose among
conflicting facts to support opinion expressed to the jury,64 the
court adopted a circuitous and largely ineffective scheme for dis-
couraging such comment. This scheme involves an initial deter-
mination of whether a comment on guilt was prejudicial, followed
by an examination of the record to determine whether evidence
of guilt was overwhelming. Only in those cases lacking such over-
55. Id. at 649, 426 P.2d at 891, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
56. Id. Compare this proposition with United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1946) quoted in text accompanying note 75 infra.
57. Id. at 652, 426 P.2d at 893, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
58. Id. at 651, 426 P.2d at 893, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
59. ld.
60. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (West 1972).
61. 50 Cal. 2d 570, 327 P.2d 97 (1958).
62. People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 652-53, 426 P.2d 889, 893-94, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 325-36 (1967).
63. Id. at 655, 426 P.2d at 895, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
64. Id. at 651, 426 P.2d at 892, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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whelming evidence does prejudicial comment on guilt warrant re-
versal of the case.6 5 In announcing this test, the court cited the
California constitutional section which defines the doctrine of
harmless error. 66 The critieria set up in Brock, however, yielded
a test more specific and more readily reviewable by an appellate
court than that required in a search for harmful error.
Indicia of Permissible Comment on Guilt
Guided by the principle that the trial judge is authorized to
make comments as necessary for the proper adjudication of the
case, the Brock court discussed standards for appropriate com-
ment, nonconformity to any of which raises the inference that a
judge's expression of opinion was prejudicial. Comment on guilt
will be deemed prejudicial if it fails to conform to any of three
guidelines: 1) the comment must be supported by a recitation
of a relevant evidentiary basis;6 7 2) the jury must be cautioned
to exercise independence of thought, the judge making it clear
that comments from the bench are advisory only and not evi-
dence; 68 and 3) the comment must not be made if there are dis-
puted issues of fact which must be resolved by the jury to arrive
at a verdict of guilty.69
If a comment transgresses any of these guidelines, the court
will then examine the record to determine if there exists over-
whelming evidence of guilt.70 While at the trial level the mandate
of Brock is for a restriction of comment should issues of fact re-
main to be decided by the jury on the issue of guilt, the appellate
review procedure endorsed by Brock vitiates this mandate.
Rather than having the appellate court search for disputed issues
of fact and calculate whether judicial comment in essence directed
findings on these issues, the court adopted an "overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt test" 71 which has been treated by California courts
as a generalized harmless error review. 2 Such appellate review
procedures convey the realistic message to trial judges that preju-
65. Id. at 655, 426 P.2d at 895, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
66. Id. The court cited article VI, section 13 of the California constitution,
which reads in part:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on
the ground of misdirection of the jury . . . unless, after an examination
of the entire case, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opin-
ion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
67. People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 654-55, 426 P.2d 889, 898, 58 Cal. Rptr.
321, 327 (1967).
68. Id. at 652, 426 P.2d at 893, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
69. Id. at 654, 426 P.2d at 895, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 93, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203,
214 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
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dicial comment to the jury about the guilt of the defendant, ap-
proaching the realm of advocacy and lacking even the minimal
safeguards of well-worded curative incantations, is permissible so
long as there is overwhelming evidence of guilt on the record. As
long as this overwhelming evidence is present, prejudicial com-
ment will not warrant reversal, even when there remain findings
of fact on the issue of guilt to be made by the jury!78
Direction of Verdicts and the Brock Anomaly
The Brock court, in support of the proposition that a judge's
comment cannot legitimately control the verdict, cited the Su-
preme Court case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join-
ers v. United States.74  The language of this case is illuminating.
"For a judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how con-
clusive the evidence. 75
Brock held that the instructions given by the trial court
amounted to a directed verdict. 6 Yet, by supplying California
appellate courts with the "overwhelming evidence of guilt" test,
the courts have been able to find instructions essentially identical
to the one in Brock not reversible error.77 In order for the appel-
late courts in these cases to decide that a comment on the defend-
ant's guilt was not reversible error, it was necessary to review the
conclusiveness of the evidence. This conclusiveness is precisely
the factor that the United States Supreme Court has held that a
trial judge may not consider in making directive comment.78
Brock has approved a policy that will in one case label a given
judicial comment as prejudicial and improperly directive of a ver-
dict, necessitating reversal, while the same comment in another
case will be prejudicial yet permissible, despite the admitted fact
that the prejudicial expression of opinion
... [M]ay lead the jurors to abdicate their awesome respon-
sibility in favor of accepting the judge's comment without de-
termining the questions submitted to them under the instruc-
tions.79
73. Id.
74. 330 U.S. 395 (1946).
75. Id. at 408. For an example of an instruction about a degree-divided of-
fense (such as murder, which may be of the first or second degree), that was
held to amount to a directed verdict, necessitating reversal, see People v. Shavers,
269 Cal. App. 2d 886, 75 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1969).
76. 66 Cal. 2d 645, 649, 426 P.2d 889, 891, 58 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1967).
77. See Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138 (1973); People v. Davis, 260 Cal.
App. 2d 211, 67 Cal. Rptr. 35, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); People v.
Thompson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
930 (1968). For a paradigm comment of this type, see note 54 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
79. People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 651-52, 426 P.2d 889, 893, 58 Cal. Rptr.
321, 325 (1967).
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A LOOK TOWARDS THE FUTURE: A PROHIBITION
OF COMMENTS ON GUILT
California law has evolved to the point where a court may
find the comments of a judge concerning the guilt of a defendant
to be unnecessary "for the proper determination of the cause"' 0-
hence beyond the province of proper judicial comment as delin-
eated by the California constitution-yet nevertheless hold that
such comments do not warrant reversal of a particular case. Only
the development of a consistent judicial preference for reversal
of cases in which the trial judge comments on guilt, or a change
in constitutional provisions to disallow such comments, can alle-
viate the necessity for a case-by-case determination of whether ju-
dicial comment interfered with the fact-finding process of the jury.
In such a case-by-case review the right of the criminal defendant
to an impartial determination by the jury of the ultimate issue of
that defendant's guilt may be lost in a maze of speculation by the
courts of appeal about the effect that a trial judge's unnecessary
comments may have had on a jury that has long been dismissed.
While the value of vigorous appeal of cases in which the trial
judge did comment on guilt should not be underestimated as a
means for discouraging such comment,8' the fact remains that the
California constitution does grant to the trial judge a latitude of
commentary that encourages abuse.8 2  While the California Su-
preme Court in Brock clarified just what sorts of comments were
prejudicial, the court made it equally clear that in many cases
these prejudicial comments would not warrant reversal.8" Given
this state of affairs, a comprehensive remedial measure is needed
to guarantee to the criminal defendant a trial in which the judge
maintains impartiality as to guilt in deference to the independence
of the jury.
In August, 1972, the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association approved a draft of standards concerning the func-
tion of the trial judge. Section 5.6(a) reads as follows:
The trial judge should not express or otherwise indicate to the
jury his personal opinion whether the defendant is guilty or
express an opinion that certain testimony is worthy or un-
worthy of belief.8 4
80. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (West 1972).
81. For those contemplating appeal based on prejudicial judicial comment, it
should be noted that it is not necessary to raise objection to such commentary
during the trial. See People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 398, 466 P.2d 961, 984,
85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 432 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 912 (1972). See the
interpretation of Terry in People v. Flores, 17 Cal. App. 3d 579, 588, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 138, 144 (1971).
82. See CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 10 (West 1972).
83. 66 Cal. 2d 645, 655, 426 P.2d 889, 895, 58 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1967).
84. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
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This writer urges the consideration of an amendment to the
California constitution which would prohibit issuing from the
bench the opinion that the defendant is guilty. The forceful lan-
guage of the American Bar Association proposal provides an ideal
standard to integrate into California law. Its absolute prohibition
of comments on guilt would put an end to tacit acceptance of a
practice regarded by California courts as prejudicial."5 With such
an amendment in force, courts of appeal no longer would need
to speculate about the efficacy of "curative" instructions, 6 and the
shift in California law from the English common law position of
extensive judicial commentary powers to a position more in line
with the protection of the right of the criminal defendant to a trial
by jury would be complete.
John R. McConica, Jr.
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, Approved
Draft, 1972, at 68-70. See § 5.6(a) and following commentary for a discussion
of the debate that led to the adoption of this standard.
85. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
86. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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